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PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUST
DISCHARGE: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL
STATUTE
Jack Stieber*
Michael Murray**

Each year labor arbitrators in the United States decide thousands
of grievances that have been brought by unions on behalf of their
members against employers. Although this private voluntary system
of arbitration has its shortcomings, both unions and employers believe
that it affords due process to workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Grievance arbitration provisions are found in over ninetyfive percent of all collectively bargained labor contracts. 1
Grievances concerning discipline and discharge constitute roughly forty
percent of all issues submitted to arbitration. This is by far the largest
proportion of issues submitted to arbitration, and reflects a ten percent
rise from the early 1970's. 2 Moreover, it appears that discharge cases
are appealed to arbitration about twice as frequently as grievances involving lesser disciplinary penalties. 3 The seriousness of the discharge
penalty to the affected employee and the frequency with which American
employers invoke it have prompted much scholarly commentary; many
commentators have criticized the common law employment-at-will doctrine as it applies to employees who are not protected by collective
bargaining agreements or by anti-discrimination legislation, civil service,
or teacher tenure arrangements. 4
• Director, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State University. B.S.S., 1940,
City College of New York; M.A., 1948, University of Minnesota; Ph.D., 1956, Harvard University.
•• Member, State Bar of Michigan. B.A., 1972, Michigan State University; J.D., 1975, University of Michigan; M.L.I.R., 1982, Michigan State University.
I. Acording to a Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 major collective bargaining
agreements, arbitration of grievances is provided for in 96% of the sample contracts. 2 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 51:5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BNA SURVEY). In
a speech reported in Daily Record No. 206, October 25, 1982, A-8 (Bureau of National Affairs, Wash., D.C.), the Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor said the percentage
of arbitration provisions had risen to 980Jo.
2. 34 FMCS ANN. REP. 41 (1982).
3. See generally D. BEELER, DISCIPLINE & DISCHARGE (1978) (discussing arbitration decisions
involving a variety of employee grievances).
4. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment
At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Blumrosen,
Strangers No More: All Workers Entitled to Just Cause Protection Under Title VII, 2 INous.
REL. L.J. 519, (I 978); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in ihe
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We argue that only a federal statute can fully protect American
workers from the harsh consequences of the employment-at-will rule.
Part I of this Article outlines the nature and scope of the problems
caused by the at-will doctrine. Part II surveys a variety of potential
solutions io these problems - unionism, voluntary internal grievance
mechanisms, existing statutes, the Constitution, and judicially created
exceptions to the at-will rule - and finds each an inadequate source
of protection. The final Part urges the enactment of a federal statute
to protect all American workers from unjust dicharge and sets out
several substantive criteria that such a statute should meet.

I.

THE PROBLEM

Discharged employees often ask attorneys, labor relations professionals, and government labor agencies what recourse is available
to them. The Michigan Department of Labor reports that it receives
hundreds of such queries every month; 5 when asked what it can do
to help, the Department answers, "probably nothing, because the
reasons why most people are fired are not against the law. " 6

A.

The Nature of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine

Unionized workers in the private sector are shielded from unjust
discharge by collective bargaining agreements; government employees
are protected either through public sector collective bargaining or civil
service procedures. Most teachers are covered by tenure laws. Specific
Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees
Against Unjust Discharge, 32 INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. PROC. 155 (1980); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481-533 (1976);
The Growing Costs of Firing Nonunion Workers, Bus. WK., April 6, 1981, at 95; Stieber, Speak
Up, Get Fired, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979, at E-19, col. 2.
The United States stands almost alone among democratic industrialized nations in not providing
legal protection against unjust discharge for all wage-earning and salaried employees. British,
Japanese, Swedish, and West German law all protect to some extent against discharge without
an objective cause. See Bellace, A Right to Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee,
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207, 208 (1983).
The International Labor Organization ("ILO") is the oldest specialized agency in the United
Nations and the only one with tripartite representation from labor, management, and government. At
its June 1982 conference, the ILO adopted a Convention and a Recommendation on termination
of employment. The Convention contains a number of critical provisions concerning termination
of employment based on the individual capacity or conduct of the worker. Its general tenor
was to limit the employer's right to terminate employment at will. The United States was the
only major indistrialized nation whose employers' and government representatives voted against
the Convention. See id. at 211.
5. Michigan Department of Labor, Statement of Office of Public Affairs (April 14, 1980)
(unpublished document) (on file with the authors).
6. Id.
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groups of employees (the handicapped, veterans, and those between
the ages of forty and seventy) are protected from discriminatory employment practices by federal and state anti-discrimination legislation.
Women and minorities are the primary beneficiaries of legislation proscribing discriminatory treatment on the basis of race or sex. 1 Although
the precise scope of this statutory protection is debatable, these laws
unquestionably limit the previously unfettered discretion of employers
to discharge and otherwise discriminate against these employees.
The employment-at-will doctrine leaves the balance of the work force
largely unprotected. To the extent that they cannot demonstrate prohibited discrimination, this doctrine also jeopardizes groups protected
by statutes. The doctrine holds that oral contracts of employment under
which the employee supplies no consideration other than his labor are
terminable at the will of either party. As Professor C.W. Summers
has shown in his review of the historical roots of that rule, there is
little justification for its continued existence. 8 Nor do contemporary
notions of fairness favor giving employers an unfettered right to fire
at will, given the devastating effect of this right on individual employees. 9
Yet, until very recently, few commentators argued that private employers
had no right to discharge employees at will in the absence of an applicable statute or unmistakable public policy. The courts have held
that privately employed individuals may be discharged for "any or no
reason" 10 and that an oral contract of employment "is not violated
even by an arbitrary, and capricious discharge." 11
Case law indicates that nonunionized employees are discharged for
a wide variety of reasons. Workers have been fired, inter alia, for being
reluctant to testify against their supervisors in criminal investigations, 12
for refusing to submit to a "psychological stress evaluation test," 13
for testifying truthfully but against employer interests in an administrative proceeding, 14 and for filing a worker's compensation
claim. 15 Hourly workers and lower level salaried employees are not
the only victims of the American common law employment-at-will doctrine. For example, a fifty-two year old executive was given seventy7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979),
proscribes discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. Ill
1979), bars discrimination against workers aged 40 to 70. The handicapped are protected by
the Employment Opportunities for Handicapped Individuals Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 795-795j (Supp.
Ill 1979).
8. Summer, supra note 4, at 484-86.
10. Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974).
II. Hernden v. Consumers Power Co., 72 Mich. App. 349,356,249 N.W.2d 419,422 (1976).
12. Philadelphia Inquirer, Aug. 2, 1981, at 1-H, col. 2.
13. Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
14. Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981).
15. Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (1978).
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two hours to clean out his desk and vacate the premises, allegedly
because his job was being eliminated after a corporate reorganization.
He subsequently learned that the job was reestablished after he left.
Fourteen months later he was still looking for suitable employment
and wondering why he had been let go. 16
Some courts have refused to sanction discharges which run afoul
of a discrete "public policy." Early examples include cases in which
employees were fired for rejecting sexual advances, 11 refusing to evade
jury duty, 18 filing a worker's compensation claim, 19 refusing to alter
pollution control reports, 20 and refusing to participate in an alleged
price-fixing scheme. 21 At least one state supreme court has held that
a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy
which an employee may refuse to violate without being subject to
dicharge. 22 These few cases do not, however, signal a broad abandonment of the employment-at-will doctrine; 23 rather, they represent only
a narrow exception to the general rule permitting discharge.

B.

The Scope of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine

In 1981, there were approximately seventy-five million nonagricultural
workers on private payrolls in the United States. 24 Of these, fewer than
sixteen million, or twenty-two percent, were represented by labor
organizations. 25 Some fifty-nine million private sector employees remain unprotected against arbitrary and possibly unfair disciplinary
penalties, including discharge, that may be imposed unilaterally by
employers for unacceptable behavior.
16. Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1980, at I, col. 5. One of the authors of this Article received more
than a hundred letters and phone calls, most of them from middle management persons who
had been discharged, allegedly without cause, after he wrote an article that appeared on the
Op-Ed page of the New York Times, see Stieber, Speak Up, Get Fired, N.Y. Times, June 10,
1979, at E-19, col. 2, and was quoted in Business Week, see The Growing Cost of Firing Nonunion Workers, Bus. WK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 95.
17. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549.
18. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
19. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
20. Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978).
21. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
22. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58,417 A.2d 505 (1980). Cf. Suchodolski
v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).
23. For a comprehensive collection of cases, see Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982). For an
excellent state-by-state summary of recent developments in this area see THE EMPLOYMENT-AT
WILL ISSUE, 111 LAB. REL. REP. BNA No. 23 (Nov. 22, 1982) (concluding that 20 states now
recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine) [hereinafter cited as BNA
REPORT).
24. 105 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1982, at 65 (table 8).
25. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EARNINGS AND OTHER
CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZED WORKERS, MAY, 1980 (1981).
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Strong arguments support allowing employers an unfettered right
to discharge employees who are still undergoing a probationary period
without having to prove "just cause." Consequently, most union
agreements provide that employers may dismiss workers during the first
thirty to ninety days of employment without a showing of just cause. 26
Assuming a probationary period of six months, some twelve million
nonunionized probationary employees would not be entitled to protection against unjust discharge. 21 The remaining forty-seven million
unorganized private sector employees who have completed probationary
periods should be protected from at-will discharge.
In about half of all discharge cases appealed to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements the arbitrator finds just cause for the
discharge. Excessive absenteeism or tardiness, loafing or sleeping on
the job, leaving work without permission, fighting, insubordination,
using profanity or abusive language to supervisors, falsifying records,
theft, dishonesty, incompetence, gross negligence or carelessness, gambling, possessing or using drugs or alcoholic beverages at work, or reporting to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol, can seriously impair
an employee's work performance and, if proven, will usually constitute
just cause for discharge. 28 Research based on published arbitration decisions, however, indicates that in over fifty percent of all discharge cases,
the employer did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy an arbitrator
that the discharge was ju_stified. 29 In such cases, arbitrators usually
reinstate the grievant to his former job with full, partial, or no back
pay depending upon the circumstances in each case. If unorganized
discharged employees had an analogous right to appeal to an impartial
tribunal, they would almost certainly fare at least as well as discharged
unionized workers whose cases are appealed to arbitration.
There are no statistics on the number of unorganized employees who
are discharged "for cause" each year in the United States, much less
how many would have been found to have been dealt with unfairly
had they had recourse to impartial arbitration. Indeed, we do not know
how many discharge grievances are appealed to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements or the number in which the grievant is

26.
27.

See BNA SURVEY, supra note I, at 55:61.
In January 1981, 18.2% of all employees had been on their jobs for six months or less.

Job Tenure of Workers in January 1981, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1982, at 34. We have
assumed that 20% of all nonunionized workers in the private sector had six months or less experience with their current employers.
28. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 652-56 (3d ed. 1973).
29. G. ADAMS, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION OF DISCHARGE CASES 41 (1978); Holly, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Case Study, 10 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PROC. 16 (1957); Jones, Ramifications of Back-Pay A wards in Suspension and Discharge Cases, 22 NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB. PROC.
163, 167 (1957).
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sustained. We do, however, have data which enable us to make a rough
estimate of the magnitude of the problem.
Unpublished figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") indicate that, between 1959 and 1971, the mean annual discharge rate was
about 4.6% in manufacturing. 30 During the early 1950's, when the BLS
was still publishing monthly discharge rates, the annual rate per hundred
employees in manufacturing appears to have been somewhat lower about 4.0%. 31 A recently completed survey of a sample of Michigan
employers found that the annual discharge rate in 1980 for all industries
was 6.8%. An industry breakdown showed a rate of 4.8% in manufacturing, a somewhat lower rate among financial employers (3.7%), and
the highest rate among service employers (10.5%). 32
These studies suggest that a conservative estimate of the annual
discharge rate for all private sector employees would be approximately
4.0%. Assuming that the discharge rate for employees with six months
or less service is three times that for all employees, the discharge rate
for employees with more than six months service would be reduced
to about 3 .00/o. Applying this rate to the forty-seven million employees
who have completed their probationary periods, we find that some 1.4
million nonprobationary employees were discharged in 1981.
What proportion of these discharges is likely to have been without
just cause? It is impossible to tell. Suppose, however, that: (1) unorganized workers had the same right of appeal to an impartial tribunal
as unionized workers; (2) one out of every five discharged employees
- about 280,000 individuals - exercised this right; and (3) as in
reported arbitration cases, fifty percent of such appeals were decided
in favor of the discharged employees. Based on these assumptions, some
140,000 discharged nonunionized workers with more than six months
service would have been reinstated to their jobs with full, partial, or
no back pay.
We believe that the foregoing estimates and assumptions are conservative and reasonable. Even allowing for major discrepancies in the
data and the assumptions, it is clear that there are many thousands
of workers who are discharged without cause because of the at-will rule.
Such is the nature and the magnitude of the problem. We turn now
to a consideration of alternative approaches to providing protection
against unjust discharge in the United States.

30. Medoff, Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing, 69 AM.
EcoN. REv. 380, 389 (1979) (listing monthly figure of .38%).
31. 77 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 86 (1954) (table B-1).
32. R. Block, J. Stieber & D. Pincus, Collective Bargaining and The Labor Market For Discharged
Workers: A Preliminary Analysis (March 1982) (unpublished paper based on research
supported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Grant No. 21-26-80-11) (on file with the authors).
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POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO A STATUTORY APPROACH

A.

Unionism

It can be argued that if private employees wish to obtain review and
arbitration of discharges, they should organize to obtain such protection through collective bargaining. To grant this protection to nonunionized employees by statute or legal innovation could be viewed
as giving "for free" that which union men and women have struggled
long and hard to obtain. 33
One difficulty with this argument is that the tide of unionization
appears to be receding rather than advancing. Between 1960 and 1980,
the percentage of unionized nonagricultural employees fell from 31.5%
to 23.3%. 34 Even in manufacturing, where unions remain strongest,
union membership dropped from 51.3% of all employees in 1960 to
40.0% in 1978. 35
It is the consensus of industrial relations specialists that unions will
not soon reverse this trend. 36 In addition, a recent analysis casts doubt
on the prospect of unionism in the rapidly growing service sector of
the economy. 37
Another problem is that under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") even employees who join unions do not receive the benefits
of unionization unless they represent a majority of the bargaining unit
in which they are employed. Thus, if 51 % of a plant's workers vote
not to unionize, 100% of the individuals in the plant remain unprotected
from unjust discharge. Furthermore, foremen, supervisors, and other
managerial employees are not covered by the NLRA. 37 For these reasons,
unionism is not an adequate solution to the problem of protecting
employees from unjust discharge.

B.

Voluntary Employer Systems

A second potential solution is the voluntary adoption by private
employers of a system of grievance adjustment that includes arbitra33. See the exchange of letters between the president of the United Plant Guard Workers
of America and the president of the American Arbitration Association which focus on the controversy of the AAA's neutrality. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 131, at A-2 (July 6, 1979), and
No. 136, at A-4 (July 6, 1979).
34. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS NEWS, Sept. 3, 1979, Table 5. See also supra note 25.
35. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS (1980) (tables 72, 74, 162).
36. THE SHRINKING PERIMETER 203 (H. Juris & M. Roomkin eds. 1980).
37. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a) (1976). Supervisors are explicitly not covered
by the NLRA, and the courts have inferred a similar exclusion for managers. See generally NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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tion. Robert Coulson, president of the American Arbitration Association, notes that nine out of ten nonunion employers are reported to
have some mechanism for handling employee complaints, most of them
utilizing an "open door" policy under which management makes the
final decision. 38 Coulson proposes the voluntary use of arbitration as
a final recourse where significant complaints are involved.
Many companies, including Northrup Corporation, Trans World Airlines, the American Optical Company, Polaroid, and Pittsburgh Plate
Glass, have adopted voluntary arbitration for their nonunion employees. 39 A study of twenty-six large nonunion companies found that
two had formal procedures for arbitration of final-step grievances, with
the company paying the arbitrator's fee. 40 In these companies, the arbitration step is used very infrequently. Other employers, including
Xerox, General Electric, Boeing, and McDonald's, have tried an alternative approach: -appointing a company ombudsman.
Such unilaterally instituted programs are rare, though, according to
studies by The Conference Board and the Bureau of National Affairs. 41
Although such voluntary systems are highly desirable, experience and
common sense suggest that the employers most in need of outside review
would be those least likely to provide it.
The approach most likely to be voluntarily adopted by employers
would be a system of review wherein some level of management would
have the last word. Any such system, though, is unlikely to enjoy great
credibility among employees. A Conference Board study of nonunion
complaint systems found that "[g]etting employees to make use of a
complaint procedure is harder than one might think. In evaluating their
complaint systems . . . some executives noted that the systems were
rarely used, and this, of course, seriously affects their credibility. " 42
The report noted that in most companies terminations were rarely appealed through the complaint process. 43
Another deficiency of voluntary systems is that they do not usually
bind the employer: a benefit unilaterally granted by a nonunion employer
may also be unilaterally revoked. Although a few decisions have held
that an employer is bound by voluntarily adopted limitations on its
discharge prerogatives, 44 the impact of such decisions is probably quite
38. Coulson, Arbitration for the Individual Employee, 5 EMPL. REL. L.J. 406 (1979).
39. Id. at 412-13.
40. F. FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION COMPANIES 299 (1980).
41. See THE CONfERENCE BoARD, NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS: A CORPORATE APPRAISAL
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NONUNION CoMPLAJNT SYSTEMS); Policies for Unorganized Employees,
PPF Survey No. 125, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C., April, 1979.
42. NONUNION COMPLAINT SYSTEMS, supra note 41.
43. Id. at 41.
44. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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limited. 45 Thus, measures voluntarily established by the employer are
unlikely to afford much protection against unjust discharge.
C.

Existing Law

At least two commentators contend that present law, properly interpreted, already protects the unorganized private employee from unjust discharge. Though we disagree with these commentators for the
reason explained in the pages that follow, they have written imaginative
and scholarly pieces, to which we are unable to do full justice in these
few pages.
1. Title VII- Professor A. W. Blumrosen argues that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 46 as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, guarantees all workers the right to be free from
discharge other than that for just cause. 47 Professor Blumrosen reasons
that when the Supreme Court held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. 48 that Title VII protects whites as well as blacks,
it "extended to all workers the law of discrimination that had been
developed in cases involving discrimination against minorities and

One study indicates that 13 states now accept an implied contract exception to the employmentat-will doctrine. See BNA REPORT, supra note 23, at 8. These cases are of little practical value
to most at-will employees. Employees whose freedom from discharge without cause is guaranteed
by a specific oral promise or an employee handbook provision are not those whose vulnerability
is of greatest concern.
45. See ABA COMM. ON DEV. OF THE LAW OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESP. IN THE
WORKPLACE, 2 ABA SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW l (1982). The Committee warns:
Toussaint and similar decisions are likely to be limited to higher-ranking employees
so far as assurances at hiring are concerned. Personnel manuals could potentially have
a much broader application. But protection can probably be eliminated if an employer
refrains from any assurances or promises, oral or written, at any time. In Novosel v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (applying Michigan law),
an employee was held not entitled to a just cause determination prior to severance where
the employment contract permitted termination cause or notice. Personnel manuals and
employee handbooks have been rejected as the basis for legally binding modifications
of the at-will employment doctrine in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, and New York.
Id. at 18.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
47. Blumrosen, supra note 4. The articles focuses on § 703(a) of Title VII which provides
that it: "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer"(!) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1976).
48. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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women. If a principle of just cause has emerged from the administrative
and judicial actions under Title VII, that principle is now applicable
to all workers. " 49
To determine the scope of McDonald, one must first examine the
line of cases from which McDonald stemmed. A suitable beginning
is Griggs. v. Duke Power Co., so an early Title VII case, in which the
Supreme Court examined an employer's use of standardized tests to
screen job applicants. In evaluating this practice, the Court considered
Title VII and succinctly stated: "Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed." 51
It is thus apparent from the beginning that Title VII's protections
accrue to those discriminated against on the basis of religion or on
the basis of personal characteristics present at birth. Title VII is a congressional attempt to compel employers to treat job applicants and
employees as individuals, not as members of racial groups.
Cases discussing what a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate to place
upon an employer the burden of justifying its actions bolster this interpretation of Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 52 the
Court was confronted with a case in which discriminatory hiring practices were alleged. In discussing what a Title VII plaintiff must do to
shift the burden of going forward to the employer, the Court said:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs
to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. 53
In a foot;note, the Court cautioned that the facts and, consequently,
the prima facie proof required from plaintiffs, would necessarily vary
in Title VII cases. 54 Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie
case the burden is on the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 55 The plaintiff may
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 524 (footnote omitted).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 431.
411 U .s. 792 (1973).
Id. at 802.
Id. at 802 n.13.
Id.
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rebut this reason by demonstrating that the purportedly legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext.
For present purposes, we need not examine what the Court has said
in subsequent cases about an employer's obligation to come forward
with responsive proofs, or the plaintiff's opportunity to rebut. We focus
instead on what constitutes a plaintiff's prima facie case under Title VII.
In McDonald the issue was whether Title VII protection extended
to two whites who, with a black worker, were involved in a single
episode of employee misconduct. The two whites were fired; the black
was retained. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall indicated that
although the McDonnell Douglas procedure required plaintiffs to show
a racial element in the employer's actions, McDonnell Douglas did not
imply a substantive limitation that blacks alone benefit from Title VII.
According to the McDonald Court, "Title VII prohibits racial
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson [the
retained black] white." 56
What protection do blacks and whites alike enjoy under Title VII?
McDonald simply extends to whites that which McDonnell Douglas
gives to blacks: the opportunit)' to force an employer to justify its actions if and only if the employee can first show a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.
The Court has most recently reiterated this point in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States 57 and Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters. 58 Professor Blumrosen relies on these cases to support his thesis that Title VII presently provides a remedy against unjust discharge for all employees. He believes that the McDonald holding,
that Title VII applies to both blacks and whites, implicitly creates a
good cause standard for all discharges:
If an employer is required by Title VII to have good reasons
for its personnel actions with respect to minorities and women,
then, under McDonald it must apply the same principle and
standards to its white male employees. The result is a de facto
substantive law rule requiring the employer to produce good
reasons or just cause for adverse personnel actions. Thus the
common law rule is abolished in toto. 59

The difficulty with this view is that Title VII does not protect all

56.
57.
58.
59.

427 U.S. at 280.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
438 U.S. 567 (1978).
Blumrosen, supra note 4, at 560.
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blacks and women, or all white males, from discharge absent just
cause. 60 Rather, it protects employees only to the extent that they can
make out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment. 61 Consequently,
Title VII is of little help to a black who is fired by a black-owned
business and replaced by another black, to a female who is discharged
and later replaced by another woman, or to a white male who is replaced
by another white male. Title VII does not bar any arbitrary discharge
that is not racially motivated. Because of this, we believe that Title
VII does not furnish a general solution to the problem of unjust
discharge for employees.
2. The Constitution- Professor Cornelius J. Peck has argued that
the federal Constitution should be read to provide protection against
unjust discharge. 62 He believes that when a private employee is discharged without just cause and without an apparent remedy, he has
suffered a deprivation of "property" within the constitutional prohibition against the taking of life, liberty, or property without due
process. 63 To find such a deprivation, there must be both a "property"
interest and "state action. " 64
It is true that on occasion employment has been held to be a property
interest entitled to constitutional protections. In both Perry v.
Sinderman 65 and Arnett v. Kennedy, 66 government employment was
found to be property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 67
As the Supreme Court has recently observed, though, ''the Constitution does not create property interests. Rather it extends various procedural safeguards to certain interests 'that stem from an independent
source such as state law.' '' 68
60. The thesis that Title VII presently provides a remedy for the unjust discharge of an
unorganized privately employed white male is here evaluated in light of the cases that were decided
prior to the publication of Professor Blumrosen's article. More recent is the case of United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Although explicitly limiting its ruling to
an examination of voluntarily adopted "bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial
preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the [plan there considered]," Weber
clearly suggests that Title VII must be viewed foremost as a remedial measure for the benefit
of the classes that Congress viewed as having been the historical objects of discrimination. But
see Note, Alternatives to Seniority-Based Layoffs: Reconciling Teamsters, Weber, and the Goal
of Equal Employment Opportunity, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1982) (arguing that Weber is
limited to its facts).
61. We do not believe that minorities and women can, as a practical matter, shift the burden
to an employer to justify a discharge merely by asserting that the discharge was motivated by
bias. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-254 (1981).
62. Peck, supra note 4.
63. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
64. Peck, supra note 4, at 13-35.
65. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
66. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
67. Government employment continues to be accepted by the judiciary as property protected
by the constitutional safeguard of due process. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979) (per curiam).
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In· other words, a private employee's job is constitutionally protected
only if the employee has an identifiable property interest in that job
deriving from a source extraneous to the Constitution. The Constitution cannot protect a "right" if the right itself does not exist. The
plaintiff in Perry was entitled to his job by virtue of a de facto tenure
system at the university which employed him, while civil service gave
the plaintiff in Arnett a continued substantive right to employment.
In the absence of such a substantive right, one does not reach the question of how to safeguard that right.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 69 illustrates this point
perfectly. Decided the same day as Perry, Roth involved an untenured
university professor who had been hired for a fixed term of one academic year. Roth completed the year, but was told that he would not
·be rehired for the next academic year. The Supreme Court held that
Roth had no property right that was protected by procedural due process. It explained that "[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created
by the Constitution," but "are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law." 10
Presently, the only source of substantive employment rights for most
unorganized privately employed individuals is the oral employment contract, which the courts have held to be terminable at will. 11 State law,
then, does not create a substantive property right which the procedural
safeguards of the Constitution may be called upon to protect.
The second aspect of the constitutional analysis is equally troublesome. One must find state action to state a case of constitutional dimension. Acknowledging this requirement, Professor Peck argues that
omitting unorganized, privately employed individuals from an otherwise comprehensive package of legislative protections precluding
discharge without just cause constitutes state action.
Remedial legislation proscribing discriminatory treatment on the basis
of sex, race, 12 age, 73 and disability 74 is already in place. Civil service
legislation protects many, if not most, government employees. 75 There
is also express legislative 76 and judicial7 7 support for the right to organize
and the grievance and arbitration procedures enjoyed by workers covered
69. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
70. Id. at 577.
71. But see cases cited supra note 44.
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to -17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
73. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. llI 1979).
74. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 i (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1974).
75. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-754 (Supp. II 1978).
76. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. V 1981).
77. See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (discussing the duty of fair representation as it relates to the processing of grievances to arbitration).
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by collective agreements. This comprehensive scheme, Professor Peck
argues, provides an outside objective review of discharges. He therefore
believes that it is state action when an employer's decision to discharge
is facilitated by the narrow window in all this protective legislation
that exposes the unorganized, privately employed individual to arbitrary
action. 78
The Supreme Court, however, would be unlikely to find state action
in a failure to legislate. In recent cases the Court has shied away from
finding state action where private parties are the primary actors. For
example, the Court has refused to find state action in a private lien
foreclosure sale 19 or when a highly regulated monopoly utility terminates
service for nonpayment of user charges, so even though such a utility
arguably functions in virtual partnership with government. Similarly, ·
the Court found no state action in a private club's refusal to admit
a black guest to its lodge, even though the state tightly controlled the
club's right to serve liquor by the glass. 81 In notable dictum, Justice
Rehnquist recently stated in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks82 that the Supreme
Court "has never held that a state's mere acquiescence in a private
action converts that action into that of the State. " 83 Looking at these
recent cases, we think it most unlikely that the courts will soon find
an activity of a private person or entity to be state action solely because
the government has declined to include the activity within the scope
of legislation.
Moreover, it is not wholly accurate to say that the government has
erected structures providing just cause determination for all groups
except unorganized, privately employed white males. As discussed above,
we do not believe that Title VII provides a just cause determination
for every discharged minority or female worker, but only for those
who establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 84 Similarly,
the NLRA and a union's duty of fair representation do not provide
a substantive right to employment tenure from management or to just
cause determinations of discharges. The duty of fair representation,

78. Peck, supra note 4, at 24-25.
79. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
80. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
81. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Supreme Court has found state
action in the discriminatory practices of a lessee of a municipal parking ramp, Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and in the passage of a California initiative barring open
housing laws, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S 369 (1967). In both cases, though, the state was
an actual party to the activity claimed to be state action.
82. 436 u.s 149 (1978).
83. Id. at 164.
84. Moreover, the disparate benefit to minorities and women of civil rights legislation has
received at least implicit approval from the Supreme Court. See United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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stemming from the union's exclusive right to speak for the employee, 85
serves only ro asssure that such substantive and procedural rights as
the employee receives from the contract will be enforced. The duty
of fair representation does not give a unionized employee the right
to arbitration. That right, if it exists, comes from the contract; the
duty of fair representation simply requires the union to enforce fairly
this contractual right. Thus, the premise that the government has erected
protective structures enabling minority, female, and organized workers
to avoid discharges unsupported by just cause is faulty. Minorities and
women still must make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The
organized worker receives from the law only the assurance that the
union will fairly enforce contractual rights against unjust discharge.

D.

The Judiciary

Several writers have suggested ways for the judicial branch to protect employees against unjust discharge. Professor Lawrence Blades,
for example, urges courts to fashion a remedy in tort for "abusive"
discharge: "the afflicted employee [should have] a personal remedy
for any damage he suffers when discharged as a result of resisting his
employer's attempt to intimidate or coerce him in a way which bears
no reasonable relationship to the employment. " 86 This tort would be
analogous to the abuse of process tort in attempting to punish as
unlawful lawful acts which are performed with improper motives. 87
Professor Blades acknowledges, though, that the employer would retain
the "power" to discharge. 88 In keeping with the tort formulation of
this cause of action, punitive damages would be available to an aggrieved employee. 89
Professor John Blackburn advocates contract rather than tort as the
proper arena for change. 90 Instead of creating a new tort to balance
a continuing power to discharge without just cause, he suggests redefining the terms of oral employment contracts.
Professor Blackburn argues that the employment-at-will doctrine is
a judicial creation designed to add a durational term to an employment contract that does not address duration. He believes that the courts
should cease to infer that parties intend employment to be terminable
at will. In the absence of information on what employers and prospective
employees expect when they enter into an employment relationship,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).

Blades, supra note 4, at 1413.
Id. at 1423-24.
Id. at 1423.
Id. at 1427.
Blackburn, supra note 4.
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courts should presume that each expects the relationship to continue
as long as the employee adequately performs the job. 9 ~
There is certainly no doubt that the judiciary has the power to work
such changes in the common law. The great bulk of tort law is common
law, developed over the centuries in continuing adaptation to changing
circumstances and evolving notions of fairness. The courts' ability to
effect dramatic evolutions in the law of contract is equally clear. It
is unlikely, however, that such a fundamental change in the law of
the workplace will emerge out of the judiciary. Robert Howlett, former
chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission and of
the Federal Services Impasse Panel, and a respected advocate for change
in this area, has concluded that "the courts, in the foreseeable future
are unlikely . . . to expand the 'just cause' doctrine to include
discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, unfair or unreasonable discharge
or discipline. " 92 Professor Summers also believes that "the Courts are
not likely to develop legal theories that will give any meaningful protection againt unjust dismissal." 93
There is good reason for this belief. Abolishing the employment-atwill rule, either on a tort or contract theory, would result in a fundamental change in employment law. Were the legislature to initiate such
a change, the final product would emerge only after extensive political
debate. Unlike a court, which is primarily concerned only with the
arguments of the litigants before it, a legislative body could draw on
all segments of society for assistance in drafting a broad remedy for
the problem of unjust discharge.
Ill.

A.

A

STATUTORY APPROACH

State Legislative Efforts

Only a few state legislatures have formulated statutory protection
against unjust discharge for all employees. 94 A Missouri statute requires
any corporation, upon written request of a former employee who has
91. Id. at 18-24.
92. Howlett, Due Process for Non-Unionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, 32 INDUS.
REL. ,~ESEARCH Ass'N PROC. 165 (1979).
93. Summers, supra note 4, at 491.
94. The Connecticut legislature has twice rejected such legislation - in 1973 (Comm. Bill
No. 8738) and in 1975 (Comm. Bill No. 5151). The 1975 bill proposed discharge only for just
cause, a bona fide business reason, or because of a reduction in force, and stipulated that an
employee was entitled upon request to a written statement giving reasons for dismissal. In addition, it advocated a grievance procedure, including a preliminary investigation by the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration and, on a finding of probable cause, binding arbitration. Similar bills have ben introduced in Michigan (Mich. H.B. 5892) (introduced June 17, 1982),
Pennsylvania (Penn. H.B. 1742) (introduced July I, 1981), and New Jersey (Ass. B. 1832) (introduced June 16, 1980).
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voluntarily quit or been discharged after at least ninety days of service,
to provide the employee with a letter stating ''the nature and character
of the service rendered by such employee to such corportion and duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee
has quit such service. " 95 Missouri courts have held that the cause of
discharge must be provided on request, notwithstanding the use of the
term "quit" in the quoted clause. Although disputes have arisen as
to the scope of this statute there is no authority holding that the statute
provides a substantive right to be free from unjust discharge. 96
In South Carolina, the Department of Labor, pursuant to statute,
mediates disputes between all employers and unorganized employees
over involuntary terminations, unfair hiring practices, and unfair promotional practices. 97 The Commissioner of Labor also may appoint
arbitrators or act as arbitrator if requested by both sides. In 1978 there
were 3,129 complaints, including 2,621 involving involuntary terminations. According to the Commissioner, 92% of all complaints were
resolved. 98
Although no state has legislated protection against unjust discharge
for all employees, many states have recently enacted statutes forbidding employers from firing or disciplining workers for going on jury
duty, testifying in criminal trials, doing military or reserve duty, obtaining mental health treatment, or filing worker's compensation
claims. 99 Congress also has acted to protect "whistleblowers" against
employee reprisals for calling attention to violations of laws dealing
with environmental protection, product safety, and consumer protection. 100 In 1980, the state of Michigan enacted a law protecting whistle
blowers. 101
South Dakota is the only state to enact a law significantly restricting
the employment-at-will doctrine per se. A person hired at an annual
salary in South Dakota is presumed to have been hired for one year.
An employer wishing to terminate such an employee before the year
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1978).
96. Recent amendments to this law place restrictions on the issuance of service letters and
address the issue of punitive damages. Employers of seven or more employees must now issue
service letters to employees who have worked for at least 90 days and who have requested a
service letter within one year of the date of discharge or voluntary quitting. Daily Labor Report
No. 250, Dec. 29, 1982, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C.
97. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 41-17-10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute also protects organized
workers.
98. Letters from E. McGowan, Commissioner of Labor, to R. Howlett (Aug. 6, 1979) (on
file with the Journal of Law Reform).
99. See DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to
Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. I, 20-21. See generally Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 277 (1983).
100. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 99, at 21-23.
IOI. M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 15.361-.369 (1981) (MICH. STAT. ANN.§§ 17.428 (Callaghan
1982)). For a comprehensive discussion of this statute, see Malin, supra note 99, at 304-07.
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ends must show that the discharge is justified by "habitual neglect or
continued incapacity to perform or willful breach of duty by the
employee.'' 102

B.

The Need for a Federal Statute

The developments noted above may indicate a trend among the states
toward broader protection against unjust discharge. They may, however,
represent only specific responses to particular employer practices interfering or conflicting with existing legislation and public policy. Professor
Alan Westin sees a trend - at least in these actions - toward guaranteeing an individual the right to fair and equitable treatment and due
process in key employment decisions. 103 He may be right. It will take
many more years though, at the current rate of change, before one
can reasonably expect judicial recognition of employees' general right
to protection against unjust discharge or discipline in the workplace.
Piecemeal legislation and narrow judicial decisions are of only limited
value. The appropriate remedy for the problem of unjust discharge
is comprehensive federal legislation.
There are, of course, good reasons to focus on state legislatures as
the primary arena for statutory reform. Enacting such legislation on
a state-by-state basis would permit the variety and experimentation that
is necessary to test new legislation before introducing it into the federal
system. 104 As a practical matter, it may also be easier to persuade a
few of the more progressive state legislatures to break new ground in
this area than it would be to move such legislation through both houses
of Congress and across a president's desk.
Despite these considerations, we believe that a federal statute is the
preferable vehicle for achieving reform. Unjust discharge is a problem
common to every state. More significantly, national legislation is
necessary because any attempt to introduce protection against unjust
discharge into a single state would almost certainly be met with the
argument that the additional burden on employers would make that
state less attractive to industrial and commercial development. 105 This
argument is especially compelling when, as now, the economy is in
recession and many states are finding it difficult to attract new
businesses.
102. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-5 (1978).
103. A. Westin, Report on Legislative and Judicial Developments on Employee Rights, 1979-80,
at 1-2 (paper presented at the third National Seminar on Individual Rights in the Corporation,
June 12, 1980, Wash. D.C.) (on file with the authors).
104. Summers, supra note 4, at 521.
105. See, e.g., Wilson, Comment on "Due Process for Nonunionized Employees, 33 INDUS.
REL. RESEARCH Ass'N PROC. 181 (1981).
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The remainder of this Article outlines a number of considerations
which drafters of a federal statute protecting against unjust discharge
should take into account.
1. Scope- In principle, a case can be made for providing protection
against all unjust discipline. ' 06 Such broad coverage in new legislation,
however, would be politically impractical and economically unwise. Including all disciplinary actions - rather than only discharges - in
such legislation would cause a huge caseload for the administering
agency and dramatically increase administration costs. Limiting the
statute to discharge actions, including cases of "constructive discharge"
(cases in which the employee is coerced into resigning or is presented
by the employer with intolerable alternatives to resignation), would
make the legislation more acceptable to legislators, members of the
business community, and the general public. In subsequent years, the
statute could be modified to include or exclude additional types of
discipline as experience dictated.
2. The "just cause" concept- Arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements almost always provide that discharge or discipline
must be for "just cause," though the term is rarely defined. Some
forty years of experience and thousands of arbitration decisions in the
United States, however, have given both substantive and procedural
content to the just cause standard.
A statutory attempt to define just cause, or to enumerate employee
acts that would constitute cause for discharge, would likely lead to
a great deal of unnecessary litigation. Unjust discharge legislation
therefore should not include a separate definition of just cause. Rather,
it should incorporate the body of industrial common law that already
exists.
What is just cause for discharge in some situations may not be just
cause in others. 101 A large number of experienced arbitrators, however,
have applied the just cause standard in discharge cases; thousands of
their decisions have been published. 108 In an experiment conducted with
his class of third-year law students, Professor Robben Fleming found
that "[i]n the discipline and discharge areas there is now a sufficient
body of experience in published cases and texts to guide an inexperienced
decision-maker to the 'general rule.' " 109
This substantial body of decisions and number of experienced arbitrators were not available when other countries enacted unfair dismissal
106. Summers, supra note 4, at 521.
107. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 28, at 610-66.
108. At least two private companies publish these decisions - the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D.C. (LABOR ARBITRATION REPORTS), and Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., Chicago, Ill. (LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS).
109. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 83 (1965).
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laws. These resources should prove valuable in the administration of
any American statute, whether enacted at the federal or state level.
3. Employer coverage- Practical considerations dictate an
exemption for small employers; a sensible line of demarcation would
be a work force of ten. Other social legislation, such as Title VII, already
exempts small employers. 110 Were the exemption level set much higher
than ten employees, however, many employees who most need protection
might lose it. Great Britain's experience with this issue indicates that
employees in small firms have a greater need for protection and have
used the unfair dismissal law more often than those in medium-sized
and large companies. 111
Employers who are parties to collective bargaining agreements providing final and binding arbitration of discharge grievances should also
be excluded from coverage. Similarly, an unjust discharge statute should
permit the supervising governmental agency to exempt employers with
voluntary system that meet specified minimum standards.
4. Employee eligibility- Employees who are already protected
against unjust discharge through collective bargaining agreements, civil
service systems; teachers tenure laws, or individual contracts of employment are adequately protected and may fairly be excluded from
coverage. A more difficult problem is the potential overlap between
an unjust discharge statute and other antidiscrimination laws. Ideally,
all discharge complaints should be resolved in a single forum, whether
it be the courts, the NLRB, an existing administrative agency charged
with resolving discrimination claims, or a new administrative agency
established by an unjust discharge statute. A discharged employee who
files a claim in any of these forums should be barred from seeking
relief under an unjust discharge statute.
Statutes in other countries and almost all collective bargaining
agreements require a minimum period of service before an employee
becomes entitled to protection against unjust discharge. In order that
employers retain the necessary flexibility in determining employee
suitability for continuing employment, a six-month service requirement
should be a prerequisite for employee eligibility under an unjust
discharge statute.
Coverage should extend to all employees except those in relatively
high managerial positions with policy-making responsibility and persons
working under fixed-term contracts of at least two years duration. Supervisors and foremen, who are not covered by the NLRA, however, should
be included. As Professor Summers points out, the NLRA's exclusion
of supervisors is based upon a potential conflict of interest in union110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
111. Dickens, Unfair Dismissal Applications and the Industrial Tribunal System, 9
REL. J. 7 (1978-79).
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management relations that is not relevant to an unjust discharge
statute.' 12 Indeed, this gap in the NLRA probably exposes supervisors
and foremen to arbitrary discharge to an even greater extent than
bargaining-unit employees who are usually protected by the just cause
requirement of a collective bargaining agreement.
5. Conciliation- Empirical data from Great Britain and West
Germany indicate that an informal conciliation procedure can resolve
a substantial proportion of unjust discharge claims without the use
of a formal hearing. 113 An unjust discharge statute should, therefore,
provide for mediation by either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service or an appropriate state agency before a complaint is certified
for hearing and arbitration. Unions and employers already utilize federal
and state mediators to conciliate grievance disputes, though published
statistics demonstrating the frequency of this activity are not available. 114
Conciliation not only can speed the resolution of complaints but can
reduce administration costs by limiting the number of cases going to
formal hearing and arbitration.
6. Remedies- The United States and Canada are the only countries
in which reinstatement is the normal remedy when an individual is found
to have been discharged without just cause. Some collective bargaining
agreements require reinstatement in such cases. Even where the contract
is silent on the remedy for unjust discharge, arbitrators almost invariably
direct that the employer reinstate the employee with full, partial, or
no back pay depending on the circumstances of the case. Several studies,
however, have found that employees do not exercise their right to return
to their former jobs. 115 Instead, they often negotiate with their employers
for an alternative remedy; the arbitrator is not involved in these
discussions.
An unjust discharge statute should specifically allow reinstatement
with back pay as a remedy. The arbitrator should also be free, however,
to award compensatory damages in lieu of reinstatement when it appears
that reinstatement would be impractical. Damages are likely to be a
superior remedy to reinstatement more often under a statute than in
situations governed by union-management agreement. As Professor
Getman notes, the reinstatement remedy works reasonably well in a
unionized plant because of the presence of a union to protect a reinstated

I 12. Summers, supra note 4, at 526.
I 13. Stieber, Protection Against Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 CoMP. LAB. L.
233-36 (1980); Falke & Gessner, The Conciliation Procedures Before the German and Belgian
Labour Courts (unpublished paper prepared for the Law and Society Association and the LSA
Research Committee on Sociology of Law, June 5-8, 1980) (on file with the authors).
114. 31 FMCS ANN. REP. 24 (1978).
115. See G. ADAMS, supra note 29, at 41; Holly, supra note 29, at 16; Jones, supra note
29, at 167.
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employee from retaliation by an employer after he returns to the job. 116
Nonunion employees reinstated pursuant to an unjust discharge statute
would not enjoy such protection. Moreover, the typical arbitration case
involves a fairly large establishment, where the personal contact between
the reinstated employee and the employer is likely to be quite limited.
A large establishment also has more options in the placement of the
employee. For example, it can assign a reinstated employee to work
under a different supervisor than the one who was involved in the
discharge. In a statute covering nonunionized workplaces employing
as few as ten employees, reinstatement may appear unworkable or undesirable from the perspectives of both the employer and the employee.
In such cases, arbitrators should have the option of awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
7. Cost- In principle, the cost of administering an unjust discharge
statute should be borne by the government. To discourage frivolous
complaints, though, both parties should be assessed a filing fee that
would be returned to the prevailing party. The assessment could either
be a relatively modest flat fee, such as one hundred dollars, or a percentage of the discharged employee's weekly earnings - perhaps twentyfive percent. The parties would also be required to pay any counsel
and witness fees, thereby leaving the state with the remaining expenses
of the arbitration process. A party who requests a transcript of the
proceedings should be required to bear that expense.
8. The tribunal- An unjust discharge statute should provide for
a final and binding decision by a single arbitrator. To the extent possible, the arbitration selection procedures used under collective agreements
should be followed. These usually provide for joint selection of the
arbitrator from a qualified panel and appointment by the administering agency if the parties cannot agree. Hearings should be relatively
informal and the judicial system's rules of evidence should not apply.
Court review of the arbitrator's decision should follow the principles
established in the Steelworkers trilogy. 111 To reduce costs, arbitrators
should be encouraged to write brief decisions. A practical means of
encouraging such brevity would be to pay arbitrators their expenses
and an approved per diem rate, and limit the number of days per case
to twice the number of hearing days.
States may wish to consider employing staff arbitrators on a fulltime basis as an alternative to paying outside arbitrators on a per diem
basis. Parties might be given the choice of using such staff arbitrators

116. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 934-38 (1979).
117. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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or, if they prefer, selecting an outside arbitrator. In the latter event,
the parties could share the costs on a tripartite basis with the agency.
CONCLUSION

In this Article we have offered suggestions and guidelines for an
unjust discharge statute. There are, of course, many alternative approaches to the issues discussed, as well as other issues that unjust
discharge legislation would need to address. Our main objective here
is to stimulate discussion and debate among academics, practitioners,
legislators, and others in dealing with a problem that cries out for attention. There is no reason that the United States, which has led the
way in providing fair and effective procedures against unjust discharge
for organized employees, should lag behind other countries in providing
equivalent protection for the vastly larger number of unorganized
employees.

